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Abstract
Most modern formalisms used in Databases and Articial Intelligence for describing an
application domain are based on the notions of class (or concept) and relationship among
classes. One interesting feature of such formalisms is the possibility of dening a class,
i.e., providing a set of properties that precisely characterize the instances of the class.
Many recent articles point out that there are several ways of assigning a meaning to a
class denition containing some sort of recursion. In this paper, we argue that, instead of
choosing a single style of semantics, we achieve better results by adopting a formalism that
allows for dierent semantics to coexist. We demonstrate the feasibility of our argument, by
presenting a knowledge representation formalism, the description logic ALCQ, with the
above characteristics. In addition to the constructs for conjunction, disjunction, negation,
quantiers, and qualied number restrictions, ALCQ includes special xpoint constructs
to express (suitably interpreted) recursive denitions. These constructs enable the usual
frame-based descriptions to be combined with denitions of recursive data structures such
as directed acyclic graphs, lists, streams, etc. We establish several properties of ALCQ,
including the decidability and the computational complexity of reasoning, by formulating
a correspondence with a particular modal logic of programs called the modal mu-calculus.
1. Introduction
Most modern formalisms used in Databases and Articial Intelligence for representing an
application domain are based on the notions of class (or concept) and relationship among
classes. For example, the object-oriented and semantics data models developed in Databases
describe data in terms of classes (sometimes called entity types) and incorporate several
features for establishing various forms of relationships between classes. On the other hand,
the notion of class (often called concept or frame) and that of link among classes are provided
in all structured formalisms for Knowledge Representation (frame-based languages, semantic
networks, description logics, etc.). Finally, this notion is also present in several type systems
of programming languages, specially those based on the object-oriented paradigm.
There are basically two ways of using and describing classes (concepts). In the rst one,
which we can call the prescriptive approach, the description formalism allows for expressing
a number of properties of a class, thus prescribing constraints that the instances of the class
must satisfy. In the second one, which we can call the denitional approach, the formalism
allows for providing the denition of a class, i.e., a set of properties that precisely character-
c
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ize the instances of the class. While the prescriptive approach is quite well understood and
established, the denitional approach is still the subject of an interesting debate, regarding
both its nature and its semantic foundation. In particular, it is well known that there are
various ways to assign a meaning to a class denition when it contains some sort of recursion
(Baader, 1990, 1991; Nebel, 1991; Beneventano & Bergamaschi, 1992; Beeri, 1990).
In this paper, we are concerned with the semantic problems related to the denitional
approach, arguing that, instead of choosing a single style of semantics for the knowledge
representation formalism, we achieve better results by allowing dierent semantics to coex-
ist.
We discuss this issue in the context of Description Logics
1
, which are logics originally
developed in Knowledge Representation to provide a formal reconstruction of frame-based
languages. Description logics describe the domain of interest in terms of concepts, which
represent classes of individuals, and roles, which are binary relations used to specify proper-
ties or attributes of individuals as well as links with other individuals (Nebel, 1990). Starting
from atomic concepts, denoted simply by a name, more complex concepts are built by us-
ing a suitable set of constructs. For example, the expression parent umale u 8child:male
denotes the concept of father (male parent) whose children are all male. The symbol u
denotes the construct for concept conjunction, while 8 denotes universal role quantication.
Typically, concepts are structured into hierarchies determined by the properties associated
with them. The hierarchical structure is dened in such a way that more specic concepts
inherit the properties of the more general ones.
We introduce a description logic, called ALCQ, which extends the well-known de-
scription logic ALC (Schmidt-Schau & Smolka, 1991) by including the so called qualied
number restrictions, which are a very general form of cardinality constraints on roles, and
special xpoint constructs, which enable us to capture the various semantics for recursive
denitions within a single formalism. Notably, the availability of these constructs makes
it possible to combine the usual frame-based descriptions with denitions of recursive data
structures such as directed acyclic graphs, lists, streams, etc.
We establish several properties of ALCQ, including the decidability and the compu-
tational complexity of reasoning, by formulating a correspondence with a particular modal
logic of programs called the modal mu-calculus.
Recent articles, (e.g., Bergamaschi & Sartori, 1992; Borgida, 1992), advocate the use
of description logics as a unifying framework for several types of database and knowledge
representation formalisms. Indeed, it is possible to show that, depending on both the con-
structs and the semantics used, one can capture several database models and programming
language type systems by using description logics. Therefore, the study presented in this pa-
per is not merely conned to description logics, but is also applicable to other representation
formalisms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic notions regarding
both description logics and xpoints. In Section 3, we motivate our approach through
a detailed discussion about the dierent semantics of concept denitions that have been
considered in the literature, and we argue for a formalism in which the various semantics
coexist. In Section 4, we present one such formalism, namely the logic ALCQ, and we
1. Also called Concept Languages or Terminological Languages.
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discuss several of its properties. In Section 5 we study reasoning techniques for ALCQ
and expose the correspondence with modal mu-calculus. Finally, in Section 6, we draw the
conclusions and discuss some open problems.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we briey present the basic notions regarding both description logics, and
xpoints. The interested reader is referred to (Nebel, 1990) and (de Bakker, 1980) for a
more complete introduction to the subjects.
2.1 Description Logics
Description logics allow one to represent a domain of interest in terms of concepts and
roles. Concepts model classes of individuals, while roles model relationships between classes.
Starting with atomic concepts (denoted by A) and atomic roles (denoted by R), which are
concepts and roles described simply by a name, complex concepts and roles can be built by
means of suitable constructs.
In this section, we concentrate on the description logic ALCQ, obtained from the well-
known description logic ALC (Schmidt-Schau & Smolka, 1991) by including qualied num-
ber restrictions. These are cardinality constraints on the role llers of a very general form,
where role llers to which a constraint applies are selected by means of a generic concept
expression, the qualier.
ALCQ concepts (denoted by C orD, possibly with a subscript) are composed inductively
according to the following abstract syntax (n denotes a natural number):
C ::= A j > j ? j :C j C
1
u C
2
j C
1
t C
2
j 9R:C j 8R:C j ( nR:C) j ( nR:C):
These constructs are not all independent. The following equalities hold: > = A t :A,
? = :>, 8R:C = :9R::C, and ( nR:C) = :( n+ 1R:C).
From a semantic point of view, concepts are interpreted as subsets of an abstract domain,
while roles are interpreted as binary relations over such a domain. More precisely, an
interpretation I = (
I
; 
I
) consists of a domain of interpretation 
I
, and an interpretation
function 
I
mapping every atomic concept A to a subset of 
I
and every atomic role R to
a subset of 
I

I
.
The interpretation function 
I
is extended to complex concepts of ALCQ (note that in
ALCQ roles are always atomic) as follows:
>
I
= 
I
?
I
= ;
(:C)
I
= 
I
  C
I
(C
1
u C
2
)
I
= C
I
1
\ C
I
2
(C
1
t C
2
)
I
= C
I
1
[ C
I
2
(9R:C)
I
= fs 2 
I
j 9s
0
: (s; s
0
) 2 R
I
and s
0
2 C
I
g
(8R:C)
I
= fs 2 
I
j 8s
0
: (s; s
0
) 2 R
I
implies s
0
2 C
I
g
( nR:C)
I
= fs 2 
I
j #fs
0
j (s; s
0
) 2 R
I
and s
0
2 C
I
g  ng
( nR:C)
I
= fs 2 
I
j #fs
0
j (s; s
0
) 2 R
I
and s
0
2 C
I
g  ng
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where #S denotes the cardinality of the set S.
A concept C is satisable i there exists an interpretation I such that C
I
6= ;, otherwise
C is unsatisable. A concept C
1
is subsumed by a concept C
2
, written as C
1
v C
1
, i for
every interpretation I, C
I
1
 C
I
2
.
Our knowledge expressed in terms of concepts and roles is assembled into a special
knowledge base, traditionally called TBox, which consists of a nite (possibly empty) set
of assertions. In order to be as general as possible, we assume that every assertion has the
form of an inclusion assertion (or simply inclusion):
C
1
v C
2
without any restriction on the form of the concepts C
1
and C
2
. A pair of inclusions of the
form fC
1
v C
2
; C
2
v C
1
g is often written as C
1
 C
2
and is called equivalence assertion.
An interpretation I satises an inclusion C
1
v C
2
i C
I
1
 C
I
2
. An interpretation I is
a model of a TBox K i I satises all inclusions in K.
Let K be a TBox. We say that a concept C is satisable in K, i there exists a model
I of K such that C
I
6= ;, unsatisable otherwise. We say that a concept C
1
is subsumed by
a concept C
2
in K, written K j= C
1
v C
2
, i for every model I of K, C
I
1
 C
I
2
.
2.2 Fixpoints
We briey recall few notions on xpoints. Consider the equation:
X = f(X)
where f is an operator from 2
S
to 2
S
(2
S
denotes the set of all subsets of a set S). Every
solution E of this equation is called a xpoint of the operator f (while every set E such that
f(E)  E is called pre-xpoint, and every set E such that E  f(E) is called post-xpoint).
In general, an equation as the one above may have either no solution, a nite number of
solutions, or an innite number of them. Among the various solutions, the smallest and the
greatest solutions (with respect to set-inclusion) have a prominent position, if they exist. A
fundamental result due to Tarski (Tarski, 1955) guarantees the existence and the uniqueness
of both such solutions in case f is monotonic wrt set-inclusion (), where f is monotonic
wrt  whenever E
1
 E
2
implies f(E
1
)  f(E
2
).
Theorem 1 (Tarski) Let S be a set, and f an operator from 2
S
to 2
S
that is monotonic
wrt . Then:
 There exists a unique least xpoint of f , which is given by
T
fE  S j f(E)  Eg.
 There exists a unique greatest xpoint of f , which is given by
S
fE  S j E  f(E)g.
3. Concept Denitions as Equations
We now analyze the notion of concept denition in detail. Let us ignore for the moment
knowledge bases as they have been introduced in the previous section, and let us consider a
dierent kind of assertion: the denition statement. Let the form of a denition statement
(or simply denition) be:
A =
def
C
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where A is an atomic concept which cannot appear in the left-hand side of other denition
statements, and C is a concept expression in ALCQ. In principle, A =
def
C is intended to
provide an exact account for the concept to A in terms of C, i.e., to dene A as the set of
the individuals satisfying C.
In specifying the semantics of denitions, we need to distinguish between two dierent
types of atomic concepts, namely, primitive concepts and dened concepts. Given a set of
denition statements, the primitive concepts are the atomic concepts that do not appear in
the left-hand side of any denition statement, whereas the dened concepts are those that
appear in the left-hand side of a denition statement.
Given an interpretation I = (
I
; 
I
), the interpretation function 
I
directly assigns
a subset of 
I
to primitive concepts, but not to dened concepts. The meaning of a
dened concept A is assigned through its denition statement A =
def
C, extending the
interpretation function so as the following requirement is satised:
A
I
= C
I
: (1)
Consider, for example, the denition statement:
parent =
def
9child:>:
Note that the dened concept parent does not appear in the body of its denition statement.
By (1), the denition statement provides the denition for the concept parent, in the
following sense: in any interpretation I = (
I
; 
I
), parent
I
denotes a single subset of 
I
,
exactly the one denoted by (9child:>)
I
, i.e., fs j 9t:(s; t) 2 child
I
g. In general, if a concept
A is dened in terms of primitive and already dened concepts, then for every interpretation
I there exists a unique way to extend the interpretation function to dened concepts, and
hence there is no doubt that the denition statement provides a denition of A.
Now, consider the following denition statement:
A =
def
9child:A:
Given an interpretation I = (
I
; 
I
), by (1) the statement is interpreted as the equation:
A
I
= fs 2 
I
j 9t:(s; t) 2 child
I
and t 2 A
I
g:
However such equation does not specify univocally how to extend the interpretation function

I
to the dened concept A, since ; satises the equation as well as any set of individuals
where each member has an innite chain of descendants that are also members.
In general, we call recursive denition statements
2
(or simply recursive denitions),
denition statements of the form:
A =
def
F (A)
where F (A) stands for a concept that has A as a subconcept
3
. According to (1), the recursive
denition A =
def
F (A) is interpreted simply as a sort of equation specifying that, given an
2. Terminological cycles in (Baader, 1990, 1991; Nebel, 1991). In the present discussion, for sake of sim-
plicity, we do not consider mutual recursive denitions, as A =
def
F (B), B =
def
F
0
(A). We shall come
back to this point later on.
3. A subconcept of a concept C is any substring of C (including C itself) that is a concept, according to
the syntax rules.
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interpretation I, the subset of 
I
that can be tied to the dened concept A must satisfy
the equation A
I
= F (A)
I
, i.e., must be one of its solutions. Observe that, in general, either
none, one, or several subsets of 
I
may exist which are solutions of the above equation.
Another convenient way to consider a denition statement is to associate to it, for every
interpretation I, an operator from subsets of 
I
to subsets of 
I
instead of an equation, so
that the xpoints of the operator correspond to the solutions of the equation. For example,
to the denition A =
def
9child:A we associate the operator:
S:fs 2 
I
j 9t:(s; t) 2 child
I
and t 2 Sg
for any interpretation I. In general as either none, one or multiple solutions exist for the
equation associated with a recursive denition, we have that either none, one or multiple
xpoints exist for the corresponding operator.
In this situation the word \denition" itself seems misleading: the body of the denition
does not give a complete account of the dened concept. An additional criterion is needed
for selecting solutions of the associated equation, or equivalently, xpoints of the associated
operator. In other words in addition to (1), a criterion is needed to extend univocally the
interpretations I to the dened concepts. This observation has led to various semantics,
each of which interprets recursive denitions dierently, by choosing, a priori and once and
for all, which solutions, or equivalently which xpoints, are to be assigned to the dening
concept of a recursive denition
4
.
3.1 Dierent Semantics for Recursive Denitions
In the literature on description logics, three semantics for recursive denitions have been
proposed (see Nebel, 1991):
 Descriptive Semantics
 Least Fixpoint Semantics
 Greatest Fixpoint Semantics
and which of these semantics is the \right" one is a long standing matter of debate. Below
we describe how each of the three semantics interprets recursive denitions, and present
some examples showing that the choice of the semantics depends in fact upon the concept
to be dened. But rst, it should be stressed that only the descriptive semantics is able to
assign meaning to general inclusion assertions C
1
v C
2
introduced in the previous section.
According to the Descriptive Semantics, a recursive denition A =
def
F (A) is a con-
straint stating that, for any I, A
I
has to be a solution of the equation A
I
= F (A)
I
. Under
the descriptive semantics, A =
def
9child:A simply states that the individuals in the class
A have a child in the class A, and the individuals that have a child in the class A are
themselves in the class A, where A is no better specied. In general the descriptive seman-
tics is not appropriate to properly dene recursive concepts, in the sense that, given an
4. We remark that a non-recursive denition is interpreted by the various semantics in the same way, since,
for every I, the equation associated to it has a single solution.
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interpretation I, it is unable to assign a unique subset of 
I
to the dened concept of the
recursive denition.
In fact under descriptive semantics denition statements are indistinguishable from the
equivalence assertions introduced in the previous section. In other words, the meaning
assigned to A =
def
F (A) is the same as that assigned to the equivalence assertion A  F (A).
Although such equivalence assertions can be used to specify if-and-only-if constraints, they
do not provide proper denitions when recursion is involved. For example, we can express
the fact that humans are mammals having parents that are humans, and on the converse,
that mammals having parents that are humans are humans themselves, in terms of the
equivalence assertion:
human  mammal u 9parent:>u 8parent:human:
Similarly we may require horses to satisfy an analogous property:
horse  mammal u 9parent:>u 8parent:horse:
However the two equivalence assertions above do not dene human and horse as shown,
e.g., by the fact that (correctly) they do not imply that all humans are horses and vice-versa
(in contrast to what happen when a xpoint semantics is used, see below).
The Least Fixpoint Semantics interprets a recursive denition statement A =
def
F (A)
by assigning to A the smallest possible extension in each interpretation I, among those that
satisfy A
I
=
def
F (A)
I
{ i.e., the least xpoint of the corresponding operator. In fact it is
always assumed that the operator associated with the denition statement is monotonic,
so that Theorem 1 applies and a least xpoint exists and is unique, i.e., the corresponding
equation has a unique smallest solution. Hence under the least xpoint semantics the
recursive denition statement A =
def
F (A) denes the concept A. It is easy to verify that
in the example A =
def
9child:A, the least xpoint semantics leads us to identify A with ?.
Indeed the empty set is a solution of the equation associated with the statement, and it is
obviously the smallest solution. Similarly if we interpret the denition statement:
human =
def
mammal u 9parent:>u 8parent:human
with the least xpoint semantics, we have that human
I
= ; for any interpretation I.
Observe that if, as above, we adopt a similar denition for horse, we get again horse
I
= ;,
so we can trivially infer that horse  human.
The least xpoint semantics is particularly suitable for providing inductive denitions
of concepts. For example, consider the class of a list (LIST) dened as follows:
 An EMPTY-LIST is a LIST.
 A NODE that has exactly one successor that is a LIST is a LIST.
 Nothing else is a LIST.
The rst two conditions can be captured by the following recursive denition statement
5
:
list =
def
emptylist t (node u ( 1 succ:>) u 9succ:list)
5. Additionally we specify that the two concepts emptylist and node are disjoint.
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where ( 1 succ:>) forces succ to be a function. To enforce the third condition we must
assign the smallest possible extension to list. Thus, the class of LISTs can be naturally
dened by means of the above denition statement, interpreted according to the least
xpoint semantics.
TheGreatest Fixpoint Semantics interprets a recursive denition statement A =
def
F (A)
by assigning to A the largest possible extension in each interpretation I, among those that
satisfy A
I
=
def
F (A)
I
{ i.e., the greatest xpoint of the corresponding operator. Again, it
is assumed that such operator is monotonic in order to guaranty the existence an the unicity
of the greatest xpoint (Theorem 1). As for the least xpoint semantics, under the greatest
xpoint semantics a recursive denition statement A =
def
F (A) denes the concept A. For
example, considering again the denition statement A =
def
9child:A, the greatest xpoint
semantics leads us to interpret A as the class of all the individuals having a child that in
turn is a member of A.
While the least xpoint semantics naturally captures classes dened by induction, the
greatest xpoint semantics naturally captures classes of individuals whose structure is non-
well-founded or co-inductive. An example is the class of STREAMs, modeling the well-
known linear data structure having a NODE as rst element, and such that the rest of the
structure is a STREAM itself. Note that streams are similar to lists except that while lists
can be considered as nite sequences of nodes, streams are innite sequences of nodes. Such
a class can be captured by the following recursive denition statement:
stream =
def
node u ( 1 succ:>) u 9succ:stream
with the proviso that the greatest possible extension is assigned to stream.
Finally, consider under the greatest xpoint semantics the recursive denition state-
ments:
human =
def
mammal u 9parent:>u 8parent:human
horse =
def
mammal u 9parent:>u 8parent:horse:
Although they do not assign the empty extension to both human and horse as the least
xpoint semantics does, we do have again the rather counter intuitive consequence that
human  horse, since human
I
= horse
I
for any interpretation I. In general under both
types of xpoint semantics the particular name used to denote a dened concept does not
have any impact on the interpretation of it, since the meaning of the dened concept is
completely specied by its denition statement.
3.2 Least and Greatest Fixpoints as Concept Constructs
The above considerations show that arguing about which is the \right" semantics for recur-
sive denitions is not really an issue. Each of them captures an essential use of recursive
equations: the descriptive semantics is appropriate to specify constraints on concepts and
is the only one that extends to the general inclusion assertions introduced in Section 2; the
least xpoint semantics is appropriate to dene a structure inductively; the greatest xpoint
semantics is the appropriate to dene non-well-founded structures. Generally, we may need
the three of them in the same knowledge base, in order to model the various properties of
the dierent concepts.
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Our proposal in this paper is exactly in the direction of reconciling the various semantics
in the same knowledge base. This is pursued by means of a logic that incorporates two
constructs, X:F (X) and X:F (X) (the symbols X;Y; : : : stand for concept variables),
denoting, respectively, the least xpoint and the greatest xpoint of the operator associated
with the denition X =
def
F (X), that is, for every I, the smallest solution and the greatest
solution of the equation X
I
= F (X)
I
.
In our approach, denition statements will never appear in a TBox. Instead, a knowledge
base will be simply a set of inclusion assertions (interpreted according to the descriptive se-
mantics) that can involve xpoint constructs. For example, in order to specify the properties
of the concepts of list, stream, human and horse we can use the following assertions
6
:
list  X:emptylist t (node u ( 1 succ:>) u 9succ:X)
stream  X:node u ( 1 succ:>) u 9succ:X
human  mammal u 9parent:>u 8parent:human
horse  mammal u 9parent:>u 8parent:horse:
Note that, if we then add to the above knowledge base the equivalence assertion:
mgm  X : mammal u 9parent:>u 8parent:X
dening the concept mgm (mammal generated by mammal), then it correctly turns out
that both human and horse are subsumed by mgm.
The availability of least and greatest xpoint constructs, by allowing dierent semantics
to be used in the same TBox, makes it possible to model not only abstract classes, but also
inductively and co-inductively dened data structures, such as lists and streams. This is
particularly important if our objective is to integrate class-based representation formalisms
and programming systems (declarative or procedural), in order to make these formalisms
more useful in practice. Furthermore, we have the possibility of nesting xpoints, thus
going beyond the simple equational format by which we motivated their introduction. As
an example, consider the following one:
Among the inhabitants of the planet \Plonk", a disease called \foo" is quite
common. Such a disease manifests itself in two forms: a \visible" one and a
\latent" one, and it has a rather intricate hereditary pattern. Individuals that
have the visible form transmit the visible form to at least one (say the rst) direct
descendant (obviously, if there is any direct descendant), these ill descendants
in turn do the same, and so on, until someone transmits the latent form of the
disease. More precisely, along any chain of descendants, the visible form of the
disease sooner or later is interrupted, because either an individual has no direct
descendant or an individual transmits to some descendant the latent form. All
direct descendants (if any) of an individual that has the latent form inherit the
visible form. The pattern goes on like this, generation after generation, forever.
The hereditary pattern (foo hp) of the above disease can be dened as follows:
foo hp  X:Y:((visible u (9child:Y t 8child:?))t
(latent u 8child:(visible uX)))
6. We also include the assertion emptylist v :node, specifying that the concepts emptylist and node are
disjoint.
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where visible and latent denote the visible and the latent form respectively of the disease,
and are assumed to be disjoint (latent v :visible).
4. The Description Logic ALCQ
We provide a formal account of the meaning of the xpoint constructs by introducing a
description logic, called ALCQ, which is obtained by adding these constructs to ALCQ.
We make use of the notions of scope, bound and free occurrences of variables, closed
formulae, etc. The denitions of these notions are the same as the analogues in rst-order
logic, treating  and  as quantiers. In addition, we use the symbol  as an abstraction
for either  or .
The primitive symbols in ALCQ are atomic concepts, (concept) variables (denoted by
X;Y; : : :), and atomic roles which are the only roles admitted in the logic.
Concepts in ALCQ are formed inductively according to the following abstract syntax:
C ::= A j > j ? j :C j C
1
u C
2
j C
1
tC
2
j 9R:C j 8R:C j ( nR:C) j ( nR:C) j
X:C j X:C j X
where A denotes an atomic concept, R an atomic role, n a natural number, andX a variable,
and with the restriction that only a variable X occurring positively in C can be bounded by
a xpoint  in X:C. We say that a variable X occurs positively in a concept C, if every
free occurrence of X is in the scope of an even number of negations, considering concepts
C
0
in ( nR:C
0
) in the scope of one negation.
The two xpoint constructs are mutually denable: X:C = :X::C[X=:X] (where
C[X=:X] is the concept obtained substituting all free occurrences of X by the concept
:X).
As before, an interpretation I = (
I
; 
I
) consists of a domain of interpretation 
I
, and
a interpretation function 
I
, which maps every atomic concept to a subset of 
I
, and every
atomic role to a subset of 
I

I
. But the presence of free variables does not allow us to
extend the interpretation function 
I
directly to every concept of the logic. For this reason
we introduce valuations. A valuation  on an interpretation I is a mapping from variables
to subsets of 
I
.
Given a valuation , we denote by [X=E ] the valuation identical to  except for
[X=E ](X) = E . In other words, for every variable Y :
[X=E ](Y ) =
(
E if Y = X
(Y ) if Y 6= X
Let I be an interpretation and  a valuation on I. We assign meaning to concepts of
the logic by associating to I and  an extension function 
I

, mapping concepts to subsets
of 
I
, as follows:
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X
I

= (X)  
I
A
I

= A
I
 
I
>
I

= 
I
?
I

= ;
(:C)
I

= 
I
  C
I

(C
1
u C
2
)
I

= (C
1
)
I

\ (C
2
)
I

(C
1
t C
2
)
I

= (C
1
)
I

[ (C
2
)
I

(9R:C)
I

= fs 2 
I
j 9s
0
: (s; s
0
) 2 R
I
and s
0
2 C
I

g
(8R:C)
I

= fs 2 
I
j 8s
0
: (s; s
0
) 2 R
I
implies s
0
2 C
I

g
( nR:C)
I

= fs 2 
I
j #fs
0
j (s; s
0
) 2 R
I
and s
0
2 C
I

g  ng
( nR:C)
I

= fs 2 
I
j #fs
0
j (s; s
0
) 2 R
I
and s
0
2 C
I

g  ng
(X:C)
I

=
T
fE  
I
j C
I
[X=E ]
 E g
(X:C)
I

=
S
fE  
I
j E  C
I
[X=E ]
g
In the last two cases C
I
[X=E ]
is interpreted as an operator from subsets E of 
I
to subsets
of 
I
. By the syntactic restriction enforced on variables, such an operator is guaranteed
to be monotonic wrt . Notice that free variables appearing in a concept are interpreted
similarly to atomic concepts.
A concept C is satisable, if there exists an interpretation I and a valuation  on I
such that C
I

6= ;, otherwise C is unsatisable. A concept C
1
is subsumed by a concept C
2
,
written as C
1
v C
2
, if for every interpretation I and every valuation  on I, (C
1
)
I

 (C
2
)
I

.
A ALCQ TBox is a nite (possibly empty) set of inclusion assertions C
1
v C
2
where
C
1
and C
2
are closed concepts of ALCQ. As before, we use equivalence assertions of the
form C
1
 C
2
as an abbreviation for fC
1
v C
2
; C
2
v C
1
g.
An interpretation I satises an inclusion assertion C
1
v C
2
, if (C
1
)
I

 (C
2
)
I

, where 
is any valuation on I (being C
1
and C
2
closed, and hence independent from valuations).
I is a model of a TBox K, if I satises all inclusion assertions in K. We say that a TBox
K is satisable, if it has a model. Observe that inclusion assertions in K are interpreted
according to the descriptive semantics.
We say that a TBox K logically implies an inclusion assertion C
1
v C
2
, written K j=
C
1
v C
2
, if for every model I of K and every valuation  on I, (C
1
)
I

 (C
2
)
I

.
4.1 Properties of the Fixpoint Constructs
In the following, we use the notation C(X) to indicate that the variable X occurs free in
the concept C (other variables could occur free in C as well), and the notation C(D), where
D is a concept, as a shorthand for C(X)[X=D] (i.e., the concept obtained substituting all
free occurrences of X in C(X) by the concept D).
Let us comment briey on some simple properties of the logic. First, the concept
X:C(X) is equivalent to the concept Y:C(Y ), as long as Y is free for X in C(X). Second,
the extension function 
I

assign to a closed concept a value which is independent of the actual
valuation . Hence X:C, where X does not occur in C, is equivalent to C. Third, since
X:C(X) is a xpoint we have that C(X:C(X)) is equivalent to X:C(X). Furthermore,
we have that the concept X:C(X) is always subsumed by the concept X:C(X).
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The next property is more substantial. Consider the class of a single source nite
directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) dened inductively as follows
7
:
 The EMPTY-DAG is a DAG (base step).
 A NODE that has connections and all connections are DAGs, is a DAG (inductive
step).
 Nothing else is a DAG.
Consider now a ALCQ TBox K containing the two equivalence assertions:
dag of student  X : emptydag t (student u 9arc:>u 8arc:X)
dag of person  X : emptydag t (person u 9arc:>u 8arc:X)
which dene the concepts dag of student and dag of person as the classes of DAGs whose
nodes are students and persons respectively. Assuming that students are persons, we want
to be able to infer that DAGs of students are DAGs of persons as well. That is, we want:
K j= student v person implies K j= dag of student v dag of person:
It turns out that for ALCQ such a property holds. To prove this, we introduce the
following two theorems.
Theorem 2 Let K be a ALCQ TBox, and C and D two ALCQ concepts in which a
variable X occurs free positively. Then:
K j= C v D implies K j= X:C v X:D:
Proof We proceed by contradiction
8
. Assume that C
I

 D
I

holds for all models I of K
and all valuations  on I. And suppose that there exists a model I of K and a valuation 
on I such that (X:C)
I

6 (X:D)
I

.
First we prove the result for  = . Let s be an individual in (X:C)
I

but not in
(X:D)
I

. Now, we have:
s 2 (X:C)
I

i 8E  
I
: (C
I
[X=E ]
 E implies s 2 E) (2)
s 62 (X:D)
I

i 9E
0
 
I
: (D
I
[X=E
0
]
 E
0
and s 62 E
0
): (3)
For the set E
0
in (3), the following expression holds:
C
I
[X=E
0
]
 D
I
[X=E
0
]
 E
0
7. We assume that a leaf of a DAG is a NODE with all arcs leading to a special DAG called EMPTY-DAG.
As an alternative, one can assume that a leaf of a DAG is a NODE having no connection at all. In the
latter case, the denition of dag would simplify to dag =
def
nodeu 8arc:dag (in which the general form
of inductive denitions { i.e., base case and inductive case { is less apparent).
8. For uniformity, we do not distinguish if X occurs free or not. Obviously if X does not occur free, the
result is trivial.
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hence by (2) we have s 2 E
0
and by (3) we have s 62 E
0
, which is impossible.
The proof for  =  is similar. Let s be an individual in (X:C)
I

but not in (X:D)
I

.
Now, we have:
s 2 (X:C)
I

i 9E
00
 
I
: (E
00
 C
I
[X=E
00
]
and s 2 E
00
) (4)
s 62 (X:D)
I

i 8E  
I
: (E  D
I
[X=E ]
implies s 62 E): (5)
For the set E
00
in (4), the following expression holds:
E
00
 C
I
[X=E
00
]
 D
I
[X=E
00
]
hence by (4) we have s 2 E
00
and by (5) we have s 62 E
00
, which is impossible. 2
Above we have dened what it means for a variableX to occur positively in a concept C.
Similarly we say that a variable X occurs negatively in a concept C, if every free occurrence
of X is in the scope of an odd number of negations, considering concepts C
0
in ( nR:C
0
)
in the scope of one negation.
Theorem 3 Let K be a ALCQ TBox, and D(X) a ALCQ concept with the variable X
as a free variable. Then, for any ALCQ concepts C
1
and C
2
:
K j= C
1
v C
2
implies
(
K j= D(C
1
) v D(C
2
) if X occurs positively in D(X)
K j= D(C
2
) v D(C
1
) if X occurs negatively in D(X)
Proof We prove the result by induction on the formation of D(X).
Base case. If D(X) = X, the result holds trivially.
Inductive cases. If D(X) has the form :D
0
(X) j ( nR:C
0
) , then X occurs positively
(negatively) in D
0
(X) and negatively (positively) in D(X). By induction hypothesis K j=
D
0
(C
i
) v D
0
(C
j
) (where i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j) and hence by the semantics of the constructs
K j= D(C
j
) v D(C
i
).
If D(X) has the form D
0
1
(X) uD
0
2
(X) j D
0
1
(X) tD
0
2
(X) j 8R:D
0
(X) j ( nR:D
0
(X)),
then X occurs positively (negatively) both in D
0
(X) and in D(X). By induction hypothesis
K j= D
0
(C
i
) v D
0
(C
j
) and hence by the semantics of the constructs K j= D(C
i
) v D(C
j
).
It remains to prove the result for D(X) = Y:D
0
(X) (Y 6= X). In this case, by the
syntactic restriction enforced, Y occurs positively inD
0
(X) and hence by Theorem 2 we have
K j= D
0
(C
i
) v D
0
(C
j
) implies K j= Y:D
0
(C
i
) v Y:D
0
(C
j
), thus by induction hypothesis
we are done. 2
Going back to our example, we can, in fact, infer that DAGs of students are also DAGs of
persons. Indeed, by applying Theorem 3 and then Theorem 2, we have that K j= student v
person impliesK j= X:emptydagt(studentu9arc:>u8arc:X) v X:emptydagt(personu
9arc:> u 8arc:X).
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4.2 Internalizing Assertions
We now show that logical implication in ALCQ TBoxes (thus also satisability of ALCQ
TBoxes) is reducible to unsatisability of a single ALCQ concept. To prove this result, we
introduce the notions of generated sub-interpretation and sub-valuation
9
.
Let I = (
I
; 
I
) be an interpretation,  a valuation on I, and s 2 
I
an individual.
We dene the interpretation I
s
= (
I
s
; 
I
s
), and the valuation 
s
on I
s
, as follows:
 
I
s
= fs
0
2 
I
j (s; s
0
) 2 (R
I
1
[ : : : [R
I
m
)

g.
 For each atomic role R
i
, we have R
I
s
i
= R
I
i
\ (
I
s

I
s
).
 For each atomic concept A, we have A
I
s
= A
I
\
I
s
.
 For each variable X, we have 
s
(X) = (X) \
I
s
.
We call I
s
the sub-interpretation of I generated by s, and 
s
the sub-valuation of  generated
by s.
For generated sub-interpretations and sub-valuations we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let C be a ALCQ concept. Then for any interpretation I, any valuation  on
I, and any individual s 2 
I
, we have:
8t 2 
I
s
: t 2 C
I

i t 2 C
I
s

s
:
Proof Without loss of generality, we consider concepts formed according to the following
simplied abstract syntax: C ::= A j ? j :C j C
1
u C
2
j 9R:C j ( nR:C) j X:C j X:
We prove the result by induction on the number of nested xpoint constructs. Base
case. If in C there are no xpoint constructs, the thesis can be proven by induction on the
formation of C.
Inductive case. We assume that the thesis holds for concepts C with k nested xpoint
constructs, and we prove it for concepts X:C with k + 1. We recall that, by the Tarski-
Knaster Theorem on xpoints (Tarski, 1955), t 2 (X:C)
I

i there exists an ordinal  such
that t 2 (

X:C)
I

, where (

X:C)
I

is dened by transnite induction as:
 (
0
X:C)
I

= ;
 (
+1
X:C)
I

= C
I
[X=(

X:C)
I

]
 (

X:C)
I

=
S
<
(

X:C)
I

, if  is a limit ordinal.
Hence we proceed by transnite induction on ordinals .
Base case of the transnite induction. 
0
X:C is dened as ?, thus trivially we have
t 2 (
0
X:C)
I

i t 2 (
0
X:C)
I
s

s
.
Successor case of the transnite induction. We want to show that t 2 (
+1
X:C)
I

i t 2
(
+1
X:C)
I
s

s
, which reduces to:
t 2 C
I
[X=(

X:C)
I

]
i t 2 C
I
s

s
[X=(

X:C)
I
s

s
]
: (6)
9. Together these notions play the same role as that of generated sub-model in modal logics.
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To prove this, we start by showing that:
t 2 C
I
s

s
[X=(

X:C)
I
s

s
]
i t 2 C
I
s
([X=(

X:C)
I

])
s
: (7)
Notice that the two valuations above may dier only on the value of X. If it holds that:
t 2 X
I
s

s
[X=(

X:C)
I
s

s
]
i t 2 X
I
s
([X=(

X:C)
I

])
s
; (8)
then by straightforward induction on the formation of C we have that (7) holds as well.
Let us prove (8). We can write it as:
t 2 
s
[X=(

X:C)
I
s

s
](X) i t 2 ([X=(

X:C)
I

])
s
(X);
and since t 2 
I
s
, this reduces to
t 2 (

X:C)
I
s

s
i t 2 (

X:C)
I

:
which holds by transnite inductive hypothesis.
Now, since C contains k xpoint constructs, by inductive hypothesis on k, we have:
t 2 C
I
[X=(

X:C)
I

]
i t 2 C
I
s
([X=(

X:C)
I

])
s
:
Hence, considering (6) and (7), it follows that indeed t 2 (
+1
X:C)
I

i t 2 (
+1
X:C)
I
s

s
.
Limit case of the transnite induction. Let  be a limit ordinal, then t 2 (

X:C)
I

i
there exists an ordinal  <  such that t 2 (

X:C)
I

. By transnite induction hypothesis,
it holds that: t 2 (

X:C)
I

i t 2 (

X:C)
I
s

s
, and thus:
t 2 (

X:C)
I

i t 2 (

X:C)
I
s

s
:
This completes the transnite induction. So for all ordinals  it holds that:
t 2 (

X:C)
I

i t 2 (

X:C)
I
s

s
:
The induction on the nesting of xpoint constructs is completed as well, hence we have
proven the lemma. 2
Now we are ready to state the result mentioned above.
Theorem 5 Let K = fC
1
v D
1
; : : : ; C
q
v D
q
g be a ALCQ TBox, and C and D two
ALCQ concepts. Then K j= C v D if and only if the ALCQ concept:
X:(8R
1
:X u : : : u 8R
m
:X u C
K
) uC u :D (9)
is unsatisable, where R
1
; : : : ; R
m
are all the atomic roles appearing in K, and C
K
= (:C
1
t
D
1
) u : : : u (:C
q
tD
q
).
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Proof If part. By contradiction. Assume that (9) is not satisable, and suppose that
K 6j= C v D, i.e., there exists an interpretation I, and a valuation  on I, such that I
is a model of K and C
I

6 D
I

. It follows that, there exists an individual s 2 
I
such
that s 2 C
I

and s 2 (:D)
I

. On the other hand, the fact that I is a model of K implies
that (C
K
)
I

= 
I
, and thus that (X:(8R
1
:X u : : : u 8R
m
:X u C
K
))
I

= 
I
. So we have
s 2 (X:(8R
1
:X u : : : u 8R
m
:X u C
K
) u C u :D)
I

, i.e., (9) is satisable, contradicting the
hypotheses.
Only If part. Again we proceed by contradiction. Assume K j= C v D. And suppose
that (9) is satisable, i.e., there exists an interpretation I, a valuation  on I, and an
individual s 2 
I
, such that s 2 (X:(8R
1
:X u : : : u 8R
m
:X u C
K
) u C u :D)
I

.
Now consider the sub-interpretation I
s
= (
I
s
; 
I
s

s
) and the sub-valuation 
s
on I
s
generated by s. On the one hand, we clearly have that (C
K
)
I
s

s
= 
I
s
, hence I
s
is a model
of K. On the other hand by Lemma 4 s 2 (X:(8R
1
:Xu: : :u8R
m
:XuC
K
)uCu:D)
I
s

s
, so it
follows that I
s
and 
s
do not satisfy the subsumption C v D, contradicting the hypotheses.
2
This result states that satisability of ALCQ concepts and logical implication in
ALCQ TBoxes (and thus of satisability of ALCQ TBoxes) are not distinct reasoning
tasks. Hence in the following we will limit our attention to concept satisability without
loss of generality.
5. Reasoning with Fixpoints
In this section we concentrate on developing reasoning methods to check for satisability
concepts involving xpoints. In particular, we exhibit a correspondence between ALCQ
and a well-known logic of programs, called modal mu-calculus (Kozen, 1983; Kozen &
Parikh, 1983; Streett & Emerson, 1984, 1989), that has been recently investigated for
expressing temporal properties of reactive and parallel processes (Stirling, 1992; Larsen,
1990; Cleaveland, 1990; Winsket, 1989; Dam, 1992).
To get a better insight on the correspondence between the two logics, we rst study
the sublanguage ALC obtained from ALCQ leaving out qualied number restrictions
10
.
Then, we study the full logic ALCQ.
5.1 Reasoning in ALC
Let us introduce modal mu-calculus formally. Formulae ;	; : : : of modal mu-calculus
are formed inductively from atomic formulae A; : : : and variables X; : : : according to the
following abstract syntax:
;	 ::= A j > j ? j : j  ^	 j  _	 j hai j [a] j X: j X: j X
where a is the generic element of a set of labels L, and every bounded occurrence of every
variable X must be in the scope of an even number of negation signs.
10. Observe that, in Theorem 5 qualied number restrictions play no role. Hence exactly the same reduction
from logical implication to unsatisability holds for ALC as well. This allows us to restrict our attention
to satisability only.
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The semantics of modal mu-calculus is based on the notions of (Kripke) structure and
valuation. A Kripke structure M is a triple (S; fR
i
j i 2 Lg;V), where S is a set of states,
each R
i
is a binary relation on S, and V is a mapping from atomic formulae to subsets of
S. A valuation  on M is a mapping from variables to subsets of S. To a Kripke structure
M and a valuation  on M, it is associated an extension function 
M

dened inductively
as follows:
X
M

= (X)  S
A
M

= V(A)  S
>
M

= S
?
M

= ;
(:)
M

= S   
M

( ^	)
M

= 
M

\	
M

( _	)
M

= 
M

[	
M

(hai)
M

= fs 2 S j 9s
0
: (s; s
0
) 2 R
a
and s
0
2 
M

g
([a])
M

= fs 2 S j 8s
0
: (s; s
0
) 2 R
a
implies s
0
2 
M

g
(X:)
M

=
T
fE  S j 
M
[X=E ]
 E g
(X:)
M

=
S
fE  S j E  
M
[X=E ]
g
A formula  is satisable if there exists a Kripke structureM and a valuation  onM such
that 
M

6= ;.
The following theorem is the basis for the correspondence between ALC and the modal
mu-calculus.
Theorem 6 There exists a one-to-one linear-time function q mapping concepts of ALC
to formulae of modal mu-calculus such that: for any ALC concept C, C is satisable if
and only if q(C) is satisable.
Proof We can dene q in the following way: q(A) = A (atomic concepts are mapped
to atomic formulae), q(X) = X, q(>) = >, q(?) = ?, q(:C) = :q(C), q(9R:C) =
hRiq(C) (atomic roles are mapped to labels), q(8R:C) = [R]q(C), q(X:C) = X:q(C),
and q(X:C) = X:q(C).
An interpretation I = (
I
; 
I
) is equivalent to a Kripke structure M = (S; fR
i
j i 2
Lg;V) such that: S = 
I
; L is equal to the set of names of the atomic roles interpreted
in I; R
R
= R
I
for each atomic role R; and V(A) = A
I
for each atomic concept A. In
addition, a valuation  on I is equivalent to a valuation 
0
on M. Now both the extension
function associated with I and  and the extension function associated with M and 
0
map, respectively, any concept C and the corresponding formula q(C) to the same subset
of 
I
= S. Hence the thesis follows. 2
It follows that we may transfer both decidability and complexity results for the modal
mu-calculus (Kozen & Parikh, 1983; Emerson & Jutla, 1988; Safra, 1988) to ALC. Thus,
we can immediately state what is the complexity of reasoning with ALC concepts and
ALC TBoxes.
Theorem 7 Satisability of ALC concepts, satisability of ALC TBoxes, and logical
implication in ALC TBoxes are EXPTIME-complete problems.
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Proof The satisability problem for modal mu-calculus is EXPTIME-complete (Emerson
& Jutla, 1988), hence by Theorem 6 and by Theorem 5 the thesis follows. 2
5.2 Reasoning in ALCQ
Next we exhibit a mapping from ALCQ concepts to formulae of variant of modal mu-
calculus, called deterministic modal mu-calculus, which has the same syntax as the modal
mu-calculus, but is interpreted over deterministic Kripke structures, that is Kripke struc-
tures M = (S; fR
i
j i 2 Lg;V) in which the relations R
i
are partial functions (Streett &
Emerson, 1984).
Let us ignore for a moment the qualied number restriction constructs. Formulae of
ALCQ without qualied number restrictions are, in fact, formulae of the modal mu-
calculus, as shown in the previous section. By using a well-known technique developed
for propositional dynamic logic (Parikh, 1981), (nondeterministic) modal mu-calculus for-
mulae can be reduced to deterministic modal mu-calculus formulae (Streett & Emerson,
1984), as shown below.
We use the following notations for usual operations on binary relations:  for chaining,


for reexive transitive closure, 
+
for transitive closure, and 
 
for converse. We also use
the following abbreviations:
[R

] for X:( ^ [R]X)
[R
+
] for [R][R

]
hR

i for X:( _ hRiX)
hR
+
i for hRihR

i:
The reduction is as follows: in a formula , we recursively replace each subformulae of
the form [R] by [R][(R
new
)

] and each subformulae of the form hRi by hRih(R
new
)

i,
where R
new
is a new symbol and both R and R
new
in the resulting formula are interpreted
as partial functions. Let us call the resulting formula 
0
, we have that  is satisable if and
only if 
0
is satisable.
We briey sketch the reasoning behind the proof of this statement. The if direction
is easy: it suces to observe that if M
D
= (S
D
; fR
D
i
j i 2 L
D
g;V
D
) is a model of 
0
,
then can transform it into a model M = (S; fR
i
j i 2 Lg;V) of  by dening S = S
D
,
L = L
D
  new, R
R
= R
D
R
 (R
D
new
)

, and V = V
D
. The only if direction is as follows. We
recall that both nondeterministic and deterministic modal mu-calculus have the tree model
property (Streett & Emerson, 1989, 1984): if a formula has a model it has a tree model,
i.e., a model having the form of a tree
11
. So without loss of generality we can restrict our
attention to tree models only. Now there is a one-to-one transformation from tree models
M
T
= (S
T
; fR
T
i
j i 2 L
T
g;V
T
) of  to (tree) models M
B
= (S
B
; fR
B
i
j i 2 L
B
g;V
B
) of

0
. Indeed, we put S
B
= S
T
, V
B
= V
T
, L
B
= L
T
, and given a state x 2 S
T
having as
11. Given a model of  we get a tree model simply by \unfolding" the original one.
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R
T
R
-successors z
1
; : : : ; z
l
,
12
we put (x; z
1
) 2 R
B
R
, and (z
i
; z
i+1
) 2 R
B
R
new
, for i = 1; : : : ; l  1.
In this way we have (x; z
i
) 2 R
T
R
if and only if (x; z
i
) 2 R
B
R
 (R
B
R
new
)

.
13
We remark that M
T
is required to be a tree because once we get M
B
we need to recover
the \original" R
T
R
-predecessor x of a state z
i
, namely we need (R
B
R
 (R
B
R
new
)

)
 
to be
a partial function, otherwise, given a state z
i
, we would not know which of the various
(R
B
R
 (R
B
R
new
)

)
 
-successors is its original R
T
R
-predecessor x, and therefore we would not
be able to reconstruct M
T
from M
B
.
By interpreting R and R
new
as partial functions, it easy to express qualied number
restrictions as constraints on the chain of (R  R

new
)-successors of a state. For example:
( 3R:) can be expressed by
[R][(R
new
)

](: _ [(R
new
)
+
](: _ [(R
new
)
+
](: _ [(R
new
)
+
]:)))
and can be read as \everywhere along the chain R  (R
new
)

there are at most three states
where  holds", which corresponds exactly to the intended meaning. Similarly ( 3R:)
can be expressed by
hRih(R
new
)

i( ^ h(R
new
)
+
i( ^ h(R
new
)
+
i))
and can be read as \somewhere along the chain R  (R
new
)

there are at least three states
where  holds", which again corresponds exactly to the intended meaning.
The above discussion allows us to state the following result.
Theorem 8 There exists a polynomial function t mapping concepts of ALCQ to formulae
of deterministic modal mu-calculus such that: for any ALCQ concept C, C is satisable
if and only if u(C) is satisable.
Proof The function t is dened inductively as follows:
u(A) = A
u(X) = X
u(C
1
u C
1
) = u(C
1
) ^ u(C
2
)
u(C
1
t C
2
) = u(C
1
) _ u(C
2
)
u(:C) = :u(C)
u(X:C) = X:u(C)
u(X:C) = X:u(C)
u(9R:C) = hRih(R
new
)

iu(C)
u(8R:C) = [R][(R
new
)

]u(C)
where R
new
is a new role. Finally, ( nR:C) and ( nR:C) are mapped to the following
formulae:
12. We implicitly assume that M
T
is a nite branching tree model. This can be done without loss of
generality since modal mu-calculus has the nite model property, and hence unfolding a nite model we
get a nite branching tree model. Note however that it would suce to assume M
T
to be a countable
branching tree model.
13. Note that this construction is similar to the one often used in programming to reduce n-ary trees to
binary trees by coding children of a node as the combination of one child and its siblings.
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u(( nR:C)) =[R][(R
new
)

](:u(C) _ [(R
new
)
+
](:u(C)_
[(R
new
)
+
](: : : (:u(C) _ [(R
new
)
+
]:u(C)) : : :)))
where the number of nested formulae of the form :u(C) _ [(R
new
)
+
] is n, and
u(( nR:C)) =hRih(R
new
)

i(u(C) ^ h(R
new
)
+
i(u(C)^
h(R
new
)
+
i(: : : (u(C) ^ h(R
new
)
+
iu(C)) : : :)))
where the number of nested formulae of the form u(C) ^ h(R
new
)
+
i is n  1.
u(C) is clearly polynomial in the size of C (under the usual assumption that numbers in
C coded in unary). Moreover, following the technique in (Parikh, 1981; Streett & Emerson,
1984) that as been exposed above, it is easy to verify, by induction on the formation of the
concept C, that the mapping t preserves satisability. 2
It follows that we may transfer both decidability and complexity results for the de-
terministic modal mu-calculus (Streett & Emerson, 1984; Emerson & Jutla, 1988; Safra,
1988) to ALCQ. Thus, we can immediately state what is the complexity of reasoning with
ALCQ concepts and ALCQ TBoxes.
Theorem 9 Satisability of ALCQ concepts, satisability of ALCQ TBoxes, and logical
implication in ALCQ TBoxes are EXPTIME-complete problems.
Proof Satisability in deterministic modal mu-calculus is an EXPTIME-complete problem
(Streett & Emerson, 1984; Emerson & Jutla, 1988; Safra, 1988). Hence by Theorem 8 and
Theorem 5 the thesis follows. 2
6. Discussion and Conclusion
The work presented in this paper stems out from (De Giacomo, 1993), where the basic ideas
of introducing explicit xpoint was rst presented, and (De Giacomo & Lenzerini, 1994b),
where such idea was further elaborated and ALCQ was rst introduced.
One of the main contributions of this work has been to devise a tight correspondence
between description logics with xpoints and modal mu-calculus. In this respect we remark
that, while ALC corresponds directly to modal mu-calculus, the full ALCQ corresponds
to a variant of modal mu-calculus whose decidability and complexity had not been studied.
More precisely, a notion essentially equivalent to that of qualied number restrictions has
independently emerged in modal logics, namely that of graded modalities (Van der Hoek
& de Rijke, 1995; Van der Hoek, 1992; Fattorosi-Barnaba & De Caro, 1985; Fine, 1972).
However the combination of xpoints and graded modalities had not been investigated
before in the setting of modal logics. Given the tight correspondence between ALC and
modal mu-calculus, ALCQ can be considered as modal mu-calculus augmented with graded
modalities. Hence the results in this paper apply to such a logic as well.
The research reported in this paper bears several similarities with the one on the cor-
respondence between description logics and propositional dynamic logics (Baader, 1991;
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Schild, 1991; De Giacomo & Lenzerini, 1994a, 1995; De Giacomo, 1995). In fact what char-
acterize description logics based on propositional dynamic logics are the role constructs for
chaining, choice, test, and above all reexive transitive closure of roles, which is a limited
form of xpoint. Such role constructs can be easily expressed by using the explicit xpoints
introduced here. It suce to resort to the following equivalences:
9R
1
R
2
:C = 9R
1
:9R
2
:C
9R
1
tR
2
:C = 9R
1
:C t 9R
2
:C
9R

:C = X:(C t 9R:X)
9id(D):C = C uD:
Note that 8R

:C = X:(C u 8R:X). In (Calvanese, De Giacomo, & Lenzerini, 1995)
a further implicit form of xpoint has been advocated, the so called well-founded role
construct wf(R). By explicit xpoints, wf(R) is expressed simply as X:(8R:X).
Our proposal of allowing for xpoint constructs explicitly in the formalism is shared
by the study independently carried out by Schild in (Schild, 1994)
14
. The main goal of
that work is to study both the expressive power and the computational complexity of
subsumption and satisability for TBoxes expressed in ALC (no xpoint constructs), that
allow for mutually recursive denitions. To this end, a description logic is dened that
corresponds to a variant of the modal mu-calculus in which mutual xpoints are allowed
but some restrictions on nested xpoints are enforced (Vardi & Wolper, 1984). It is well
known that mutual xpoints can be re-expressed by means of nested ones (see, for example,
Park, 1976; de Bakker, 1980). As a consequence of this observation it follows that the logic
introduced in this paper, is more expressive than the one analyzed in (Schild, 1994) since,
on the one hand, it allows nesting of xpoints without any restriction, on the other hand
it makes it possible to state sophisticated forms of cardinality constraints on role llers by
means of qualied number restrictions.
The present work can be extended along several directions. We conclude by outlining
two of them.
We already noticed that xpoint constructs allow for representing not only abstract
classes, but also several data structures extensively used in software development. We
believe that this characteristic is an important step towards a satisfactory integration of
description logics with both traditional and declarative programming systems. Indeed the
description logic proposed in this paper provides powerful mechanisms for data structure
modeling. In particular, the properties stated in Section 4.1 can be the base to formulate a
notion of parametric concept
15
. For instance, the expression (named dag of [Z])
X : emptydag t (Z u 9arc:>u 8arc:X)
where Z is a formal parameter, denotes the class of DAGs whose nodes are left unspecied.
This class can be used in several ways in the TBox. For example, it can be instantiated
by binding the formal parameter to actual parameters, thus getting, say, dag of [student],
dag of [person], etc., which are concepts inheriting the properties of dag of [Z].
14. In (Schild, 1994) number restrictions are not considered.
15. Note that parametric concepts can be introduced also in simpler logics which do not include xpoint
constructs.
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Although ALCQ is a powerful logic, it lacks the construct for inverse roles which is
needed for example to correctly capture the notions of (nite) TREE, BINARY-TREE, etc.
Indeed, to dene the concept of TREE (an EMPTY-TREE is a TREE; a NODE that has
at most one parent, some children, and all children are TREEs, is a TREE; nothing else is a
TREE) we can write tree  X : empty treet(nodeu( 1 child
 
:>)u9child:>u8child:X
where child
 
denotes the inverse of child. Notice that the introduction of inverse roles
does not pose any diculty from the semantical point of view; however, its impact on
the reasoning method needs to be investigated. More generally, a wide variety of concept
constructs can be studied in conjunction with xpoints. The research on description logics
related to propositional dynamic logics in (De Giacomo & Lenzerini, 1994a, 1995; Calvanese
et al., 1995; De Giacomo, 1995) may give us hints on how to proceed along this direction.
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